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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Bible Reading in Public Schools
The constitutionality of Bible reading in
public schools has not yet been passed
upon by the United States Supreme Court.'
A recent case in a Pennsylvania district
court highlighted the problem of the con-
stitutionality of a statute authorizing Bible
reading in the public school system.2 Plain-
tiffs, as members of the Unitarian faith,
sought to enjoin the reading of ten verses
of the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's
Prayer in a school attended by their chil-
dren. The defendant school district con-
tended that such reading without comment
does not constitute an establishment of re-
ligion or a prohibition of the free exercise
thereof, supporting the argument by citing
the fact that attendance was not compul-
sory. Defendant argued further that the
reading of the Bible is a substantial aid in
developing the minds and morals of school
children and that the state has a constitu-
!Certiorari was denied in Tudor v. Board of
Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953), cert.
denied sub nom. Gideons Int'l v. Tudor, 348 U.S.
816 (1954) (involving the distribution of the
Gideon Bible in public schools). Because the
question had become moot since the party in
interest had graduated, the Supreme Court also
refused to review Doremus v. Board of Educ.,
5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed,
342 U.S. 429 (1952).
2 Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township,
177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
tional right to employ such practice in its
educational program. Limiting its discus-
sion to the issue of Bible reading3 the Court
stated that the Bible is a religious document
and to characterize it as a work of art with
solely literary or historical, significance is
unrealistic. Relying solely on the religious
nature of the Bible, the Court held that
the Pennsylvania statute is an unconstitu-
tional aid to religion.
In 1878 the Supreme Court of the United
States in affirming a conviction of a Mor-
mon for bigamy under an act of Congress
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment cre-
ated a "wall of separation between Church
and State."'4 In Everson v. Board of Educ.,5
the Court reiterated this separation doctrine
with regard to its limitation upon the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment main-
taining, however, that reimbursing for fares
paid for the transportation by public car-
rier of children attending parochial schools
did not breach this "impregnable wall."
The doctrine was again set forth in Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.6 The
Court here relied on dicta in the Everson
case in holding that the Illinois released-
time provision allowing public school prop-
3 Id. at 404.
4 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878).
5 330U.S. I (1947).
6333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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erty to be used for religious instruction was
unconstitutional as violative of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The strict
separation doctrine as announced in the
McCollum case was later modified some-
what by the Court's decision in Zorach v.
Clauson.7 Distinguishing McCollum where
public school property was employed in the
program, the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a New York statute providing
for a released-time program where the in-
struction was not given on public school
property. While reaffirming its decision
in McCollum, the Court in Zorach main-
tained that such a program was a permis-
sible state "accommodation" of the religious
needs of the people.8
The constitutional limitation as previ-
ously discussed provided for a rather sharp
cleavage with respect to church-state rela-
tionships, maintaining that neither the state
nor the federal government ". . . can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all reli-
gions, or prefer one religion over another."9
With respect to the issue raised by the prin-
cipal case, however, some authorities con-
tend that an analysis of the intent of the
legislators at the time of the passage of the
First Amendment demonstrates that Bible
reading was not intended to be excluded
from the public schools. In Carden v.
Bland,'0 the court stated that the separation
doctrine should "not be tortured into a
meaning that was never intended by the
Founders of this Republic, with the result
that the public school system of the several
states is to be made a Godless institution as
a matter of law."'" Similarly, other state
7 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
s Id. at 315.
9 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947).
10 199 Tenn. 665, 288 S.W.2d 718 (1956).
11 Id. at -, 288 S.W.2d at 724.
courts, relying on an historic interpretation
of the separation of Church and State have
held Bible reading in public schools not to
be violative of their constitutions. 12 In a
recent New York case, l3 the court in an
extensive analysis of the times and events
surrounding the adoption of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments stated "that such
separation did not extend to the exclusion
of prayer or the reading of the Bible from
public school routine." 14 The court empha-
sized that although the separation doctrine
is traced back to Jefferson and Madison, it
was their view also that the sense of the
nation and the times must be consulted in
defining the extent of this separation doc-
trine. 15
The Supreme Court of the United States
has used a strict interpretation of the
Constitution in holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit not only
preferences but also aid to any and all
religions. The Zorach decision modifies this
approach somewhat and now the govern-
ment can without violation accommodate
all religions.' 6 Particularizing these general
rules with regard to Bible reading, it would
seem that under a strict approach, such a
practice would fall within the purview of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Accepting this premise, it must then be
decided whether the Bible is a sectarian
instrument in such a sense that its use
would constitute a preference to a particu-
lar religion.
12 People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276,
255 Pac. 610 (1927); Pfeiffer v. Board of Educ.,
118 Mich. 560, 77 N. W. 250 (1898).
13 Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc.2d 659, 191 N.Y.S.2d
453 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
14 Id. at 675, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
15 Id. at 673, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
16 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Much controversy has arisen over the
sectarian nature of the Bible. Those courts
which have found the Bible to be sectarian
have based this result on one of two theo-
ries: first, divergence of views as to doc-
trine although taken from the same source
book;1 7 and secondly, the lack of universal
acceptance, not of doctrine but of version.' 8
Conversely, those courts which have held
the Bible to be nonsectarian have reasoned
that the Bible transcends all creeds and
consequently does not constitute either aid
or preference to religion.19
Where the Bible has been held non-sec-
tarian, the Bible in question generally con-
sisted only of the Old Testament.20 The
problem becomes more acute, however,
where both the Old and New Testaments
are employed since this might be consid-
ered prejudicial to those of the Jewish
faith. 21
This problem was highlighted by two
New Jersey cases. 22 In Doremus v. Board
of Educ.23 the constitutionality of two New
Jersey statutes dealing with the reading of
1 7State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177,
44 N.W. 967 (1890).
Is People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 111.
334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910).
19 See Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist.,
120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792 (1905); Herold v. Par-
ish Bd. of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 68 So.
116 (1915) (dictum). It has even been said that
"the suggestion that the Bible in either version is
a sectarian book borders on sacrilege." Stevenson
v. Hanyon, 7 Pa. Dist. 585, 590 (1898), as found
in 40 CORNELL L.Q. 474, 475 (1955).
20 See generally Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5
N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed,
342 U.S. 429 (1952).
21 But see Wilkerson v. City of Rome, 152 Ga.
762, 110 S.E. 895 (1922).
22 Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d
857 (1953), cert. denied sub noin. Gideons Int'l
v. Tudor, 348 U.S. 816 (1954); Doremus v. Board
of Educ., supra note 20.
23 See note 20 supra.
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the Old Testament in the public schools
was questioned. The contention advanced
was that such reading was an aid to reli-
gion. The court rejected this claim and de-
cided that the Constitution only forbids aid
to sectarian religions and that the Old Tes-
tament is not sectarian when read without
comment. In Tudor v. Board of Educ.,2 4
decided four years later, there was involved
the distribution of the Gideon Bible in the
public school system. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court disallowed the practice main-
taining that this was not a permissible
accommodation of religion. The rationale
of the court was that the Gideon Bible is
a sectarian document, the distribution of
which would amount to a preference of one
religious sect over another.
Although Tudor on its face seems to be
inconsistent with Doremus, a closer analy-
sis points up this distinction: the Gideon
Bible in the Tudor case includes the New
Testament, which is unacceptable to Jews
and other minority groups. The Bible in
the Doremus case consisted only of the Old
Testament, and the court emphasized that
it was concerned only with the Old Testa-
ment which is generally acceptable to both
Christians and Jews.25
Another facet of the problem often con-
sidered by the courts is the compulsory
aspect of Bible reading, that is, whether
the child is required to remain in the room
during such reading or may absent himself
at the request of his parents. Thus, some
decisions have upheld the practice where
24 See note 22 supra.
25 Although this distinction has been termed su-
perficial by text writers, see, e.g., Cushman, The
Holy Bible and the Public Schools, 40 CORNELL
L.Q. 475, 486 (1955), the distinction appears to
be valid if the first premise is accepted, i.e., the
Old Testament is nonsectarian.
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provision was made for the child being ex-
cused during such exercises, reasoning that
the child's freedom of conscience is not
violated where attendance is not compul-
sory. 20 However, other courts have refused
to recognize as a valid defense the conten-
tion that the practice was non-compulsory,
reasoning that the students were being
discriminated against not only if they stayed
in the room, but also when they chose to
absent themselves.2 7 The Supreme Court of
Illinois has stated:
The exclusion of a pupil from this part of
the school exercises in which the rest of the
school joins, separates him from his fellows,
puts him in a class by himself, deprives him
of his equality with the other pupils, subjects
him to a religious stigma and places him at
a disadvantage in the school, which the
law never contemplated. All this is because
of his religious belief. 28
Psychological factors have been consid-
ered. to overcome the argument that non-
compulsory Bible reading is not an infringe-
ment on the child's freedom of conscience.
It has been said that the child has a need
to belong and to be identified with the
group.29 In the Tudor case, testimony of
experts in the field of psychology and edu-
cation indicated that the distribution of the
Gideon Bible would cause a feeling of dif-
ference and ostracism in those children
26 See People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo.
276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927); Kaplan v. Independent
School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927);
State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 226
N.W. 348 (1929).
27 See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (concurring opinion);
People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 111. 334,
92 N.E. 251 (1910); State ex rel. Weiss v. District
Bd., 76 Wis. 177,44 N.W. 967 (1890).
28 People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 111.
334, 92 N.E. 251, 256 (1910).
29 PRESCOTT, EMOTION AND THE EDUCATIVE PROC-
ESS 117 (1938).
whose parents, because of religious convic-
tions, compelled them to refuse the Bible.3 °
The Supreme Court of the United States
has also recognized and considered the co-
ercive element attached to programs of
religious instruction. In the McCollum case,
Justice Frankfurter stated:
that a child is offered an alternative may
reduce the constraint; it does not eliminate
the operation of influence by the school in
matters sacred to conscience and outside
the school's domain. The law of imitation
operates, and non-conformity is not an out-
standing characteristic of children. The re-
sult is an obvious pressure upon children
to attend. 31
In the same case however, Justice Jackson
in a concurring opinion thought that the
Constitution was not designed to protect
one from the embarrassment that always at-
tends non-conformity, whether in religion,
politics, behavior or dress. 32 It is well to
note, however, that these remarks were
made not in relation to Bible reading but
in connection with the Illinois released-time
program. The possible validity of the de-
fense of divisiveness is conditioned on the
acceptance of the premise that the Bible is
non-sectarian by nature. If the Bible is held
to be a sectarian instrument then the prac-
tice, whether compulsory or not, is pro-
scribed by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments as an unconstitutional aid to religion.
The population of the United States
being predominantly Protestant, a Protes-
tant version of the Bible was invariably
employed where the practice of Bible read-
30 Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 50-5 1, 100
A.2d 857, 867 (1953), cert. denied sub noih. Gid-
eons Int'l v. Tudor, 348 U.S. 816 (1954).
31 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (concurring opinion).
32 Id. at 233 (concurring opinion).
ing was authorized. 33 Consequently, Cath-
olic parents were often the complainants in
actions brought to exclude the practice
from public schools.3 4 The present Catholic
position is not easy of definition. In Hackett
v. Brookville Graded School Dist.,35 the
testimony of a Catholic priest pointed the
way somewhat when he distinguished the
attitude of the Catholic from that of the
Protestant religion on the matter. Whereas
Protestants advocate individual interpreta-
tion, Catholics maintain that the Church
is the interpreter of the Bible.3 6 The court
in the Tudor case went even further in
defining the Catholic position, concluding
from the evidence introduced that:
the canon law of the Catholic Church pro-
vides that "Editions of the original text of
the sacred scriptures published by non-Cath-
olics are forbidden ipso jure. '37
Thus, it is extremely doubtful that Cath-
olic authorities would sanction the reading
of a non-Catholic version of the Bible to
Catholic children in public schools. Per-
haps People ex rel. Ring v. Board of
Educ.3s contains the most lucid analysis
of the view which considers the Bible to
be sectarian. In concluding that the King
James version is sectarian the court said:
Christianity is a religion. The Catholic
Church and the various Protestant
33 See, e.g., Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Direc-
tors, 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915); Hackett v.
Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 87
S.W. 792 (1905); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me.
379 (1854).
34 See generally Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc.2d 659,
675, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 472-73 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
35 See note 33 supra.
36 See Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist.,
supra note 33 at -, 87 S.W. at 794.
37 Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 47, 100
A.2d 857, 865 (1953), cert. denied sub non. Gid-
eons Int'l v. Tudor, 348 U.S. 816 (1954).
38 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910).
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Churches are sects of that religion. These
two versions of the Scriptures are the bases
of the religion of the respective sects. Prot-
estants will not accept the Douay Bible as
representing the inspired word of God. As
to them, it is a sectarian book containing
errors and matter which is not entitled to
their respect as a part of the Scriptures. It
is consistent with the Catholic faith but not
the Protestant. Conversely, Catholics will
not accept King James' version. As to them,
it is a sectarian book inconsistent in many
particulars with their faith, teaching what
they do not believe. The differences may
seem to many so slight as to be immaterial,
yet . . . sectarian aversions, bitter animos-
ities, and religious persecutions have had
their origin in apparently slender distinc-
tions.39
In striking down the statute in the
instant case as unconstitutional, the Court
departed from prior state court decisions.
In discussing the issue, the Court con-
cluded that the practice of Bible reading
was within the purview of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Maintaining that
the religious nature of the Bible required
no demonstration, the Court considered
that its decision applied regardless of the
version used and the non-compulsory
nature of the exercise.40
The decision appears to be the only
sound solution to a difficult problem. There
is undoubtedly a public interest involved
in the inculcation of a moral sense and
of a knowledge of God in the minds of
school children. However, in regard to
religious practices, ours is a heterogeneous
nation, and each individual is guaranteed
the right to know and to worship God in
his own way. This freedom might well be
violated by the inclusion of Bible reading
39 Id. at 344-45,92 N.E. at 254.
40 Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township,
177 F. Supp. 398, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
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in the public school curriculum. Thus, the
practical result of this decision in leaving
religious instruction in the home and the
Church appears to be the most reasonable
under all the circumstances.
Pupil Assignment in the South
The Brown' decisions of the United
States Supreme Court have definitively
declared that a state may not deny to any
person because of race the right to attend
any of its schools. The Court in those cases
did not order integration, but forbade dis-
crimination.2 The recent case of Parham
v. Dove3 is one of the many decisions
which illustrate the dramatic impact of this
determination on the legislative and judicial
climate of the Southern states. Here, three
Negro petitioners in a class action sought
to compel the members of the defendant
school board to admit them to white
schools within their district. The District
Court found the Arkansas Pupil Assign-
ment Act to be constitutional on its face,
but upon a finding that its present applica-
tion was invalid, the court ordered the ad-
mittance of the petitioners to the requested
schools. 4 The Eighth Circuit, on appeal,
affirmed the constitutionality of the act but
reversed the order of admittance on the
ground that the petitioners had not ex-
hausted the administrative remedies avail-
able pursuant to the act.5
1 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 See Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School
Dist., 241 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); Meador, The Con-
stitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public
Schools, 45 VA.L.REv. 517, 524 (1959).
3 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959), reversing in part
176 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
4 Dove v. Parham, 176 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ark.
1959).
5 Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959).
Pupil assignment laws, like most of the
post-Brown legislation in the South, have
for their primary objective the protection
of the traditional Southern educational sys-
tem from the adverse effects of the Brown
decisions.' Such laws have emerged as the
most successful method of effecting the
South's determination not to comply with
the Supreme Court's segregation prohibi-
tion.7 Their prominence stems from the
wide use to which the Southern legislatures
have put them" and their success is attribu-
table to the fact that they may be drafted
in such manner as to withstand direct
constitutional attack. 9
A primary consideration in evaluating
these assignment plans is their definitively
expressed purpose to continue the South-
ern educational system as it was before
the Brown decisions.' 0 Here again, some
courts have stated that the motivating
forces behind the statutes in no way affect
their constitutional validity." In re-examin-
ing the elimination of good faith as a pre-
requisite for constitutional validity, it
would be well to consider this caveat of
the Supreme Court:
In short, the constitutional rights of children
not to be discriminated against in school ad-
6 See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,
162 F. Supp. 372, 380 n. 9 (N.D. Ala. 1958);
Meador, supra note 2, at 528.
7 Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment
of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA.L.REv. 517,
526 (1959).
s Id. at 526-32.
9 See Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Shut-
tlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F.
Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S.
101 (1958).
10 See note 6 supra.
"Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535
(1876); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. ot
Educ., supra note 9.
mission on grounds of race or color declared
by this Court in the Brown case can neither
be nullified openly and directly by state leg-
islators or state executive or judicial officers,
nor nullified indirectly by them through
evasive schemes for segregation whether at-
tempted "ingeniously or ingenuously.' 1 2
Apart from the consideration of good
faith, some assignment plans, while com-
plying with the strict letter of the law,
seem to be simultaneously defying the
spirit of that law.
In general, pupil assignment laws au-
thorize school boards to assign individual
students to schools, such assignment to
be based on numerous factor tests. No
racial criterion may be included. 13
There are three basic tests which deter-
mine the validity or invalidity of assign-
ment plans.' 4 The first and sine qua non
is that the exclusion of any racial factor
in the assignment procedure must be
clear. 15 Secondly, the statute itself must
supply adequate standards to guide the
board in making the assignments.' 6 These
standards usually consist of the physical
and educational facilities of the school
system, the mental, physical, educational,
psychological and moral qualifications of
the applicant, and the resulting effects of
re-assignment on a particular school or the
community itself.1'7 Thirdly, the assignment
12 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958). (Em-
phasis added.)
13 LEFLAR, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED 1, 12
(1957).
14 See Meador, The Constitution and the Assign-
nient of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA.L.REv.
517, 543 (1959).
15 Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d
156, 165 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921
(1957).
16 See Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 728 (4th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
17 Note, 57 COLUM.L.REv. 537, 540 (1957).
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plan must not be an integral part of an
overall legislative scheme which is on its
face and in its entirety unconstitutional.s
For example, Virginia, while adopting what
might have been a constitutional plan,
destroyed any chance of validity by simul-
taneously enacting an Appropriations Act,
which would have closed any integrated
school by refusing it any funds.1 9 There
is, of course, a fourth requirement that the
administrative procedure of the act should
not be unreasonable nor dilatory or im-
pedient.20 The pertinent requirement in the
principal case was that of adequate
standards. 21
The requirement of adequate standards
is demanded by the courts in order to elim-
inate arbitrary rulings which a school
board might make. In the Arkansas Act,
22
the factor tests, like the whole act, were
modelled on the Alabama School Place-
ment Law, 23 whose constitutional validity
had been already tested and upheld in
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ.24 The difficulty, however, is that
some of the adopted and accepted stand-
ards seem to effectuate the very purpose
which they were supposedly designed to
18 Adkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.
Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957).
19 Ibid.
20 See Adkins v. School Bd., supra note 18; Car-
son v. Warlick, supra note 16.
21 The Arkansas plan excluded racial criteria.
Further, it did not suffer from the defect which
undermined the Virginia Plan. See Parham v.
Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959).
2 2 ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 80, §§ 1522, 1527 (Supp.
1960). For an analysis of the statute see Dove v.
Parham, 176 F. Supp. 242, 244-47 n. 4 (E.D. Ark.
1959).
23 ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 61(4) (Supp. 1957).
24 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.), aft'd per curiam,
358 U.S. 101 (1958).
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prevent, that is, arbitrary rulings. For
example, consider the following factor tests
incorporated into the Arkansas Act:
... the psychological effect upon the pupil
of attendance at a particular school; the pos-
sibility of breaches of the peace or ill will or
economic retaliation within the community
• .. the maintenance or severance of estab-
lished social and psychological relationships
with other pupils and with teachers .... 25
It is fairly obvious that there are few
Negro children who could not be barred
by the strict application of such broad
factor tests, with the result that a con-
trolled segregation program may be main-
tained.
The procedural requirements of the Act
were found to be adequate in the principal
case. However, the District Court held
that after the petitioners' parents had made
three oral requests for re-assignment, which
were refused, any further application to
the school board for a hearing pursuant
to the act would have been futile.2 6 Upon
this ground the court ordered the immedi-
ate admittance of the petitioners to the
new schools. The Eighth Circuit reversed
this order relying on Carson v. Board of
Educ.,27 wherein it was stated:
Where the state law provides adequate ad-
ministrative procedure for the protection of
such rights, the federal courts manifestly
should not interfere with the operation of
the schools until such administrative proce-
dure has been exhausted and the interven-
tion of the federal courts is shown to be
necessary.28
Even though its decision was bottomed
25 See note 22, supra.
26 Dove v. Parham, 176 F. Supp. 242, 250 (E.D.
Ark. 1959).
27 227 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1955) (per curiam).
28 Carson v. Board of Educ., 227 F.2d 789, 790
(4th Cir. 1955) (per curiam).
upon this admittedly valid rule, the Court's
final determination in the Parham case is
questionable. Although the administrative
procedure is adequate, when the prosecu-
tion of one's claim through the administra-
tive machinery would be futile, the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
inapplicable.29 The lower court found as
a fact that further application by the peti-
tioners would be futile. The Circuit Court
disagreed with this conclusion not, seem-
ingly, on the ground that it was clearly
erroneous,30 but that it felt that the court
could not say " . . . as a matter of legal
certainty what the result of an application
. ..would be . . .' 1 on the basis of the
testimony educed. It is submitted that
such legal certainty is not required of the
finder of the fact.
The District Court held that after three
oral requests for re-assignment were re-
jected, it would have been futile for the
petitioners to request a hearing. This was
not an arbitrary conclusion but one based
on the particular circumstances of the
case. The continued operation of a segre-
gated school program, the three rejections
and the avowed purpose to prevent any
integration plan led the District Court to
its determination that it would be futile
for petitioners to try once again. It is sub-
mitted that the' Eighth Circuit made a
determination based largely on the form
of a statute rather than looking to its sub-
stance and circumstances.
Pupil assignment plans have strong ad-
vantages and equally strong disadvantages.
They can accomplish great good, if, when
29 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp.
337 (E.D. La. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957).3 0 FED R. Civ. P. 52(e).
31 Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959).
properly administered, they are supple-
mented by a more affirmative plan for
integration. 32 In this way they can help
to satisfy the Brown decisions by positively
effecting integration while controlling this
action so as to prevent a cultural upheaval.
On the other hand, the disadvantages of
such plans must be carefully taken into
consideration because of the wide use to
which these plans are presently being put
in the South. By unscrupulous administra-
tion or by carefully worded escape clauses,
they may be used as a scheme to perpetuate
the segregational policies of the South.
Also, even though factor tests are included
in such plans, the breadth of the tests lends
wide power to school boards which may
enable them to arbitrarily violate constitu-
tionally protected rights under the guise of
a constitutional law.
In every aspect of human rights the
natural law has as its working basis the
dignity of man as man. 33 This dignity ante-
dates the very formation of a state and
would therefore require of a state recogni-
tion and adherence to the principle. 34 The
Supreme Court in the Brown cases gave
this principle increased effect as it relates
to educational organization. But neither
32 One of the suggested affirmative plans is a
stratal desegregation. For example, in the first
year senior high school, classes would be deseg-
regated and by annual retrogressions there would
ultimately result a completely integrated system.
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Of
course, this plan could easily be reversed by begin-
ning the program in the first grade of the grammar
schools. The latter would probably better effectu-
ate the overall purpose of the plan because it
would accustom the young to the new system.
33 Kenealy, Segregation A Challenge to the
Legal Profession, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 37, 38
(1957).
34 Id. at 38, 42.
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legislative fiat nor judicial construction and
order' alone can accomplish adherence to
principles of natural justice. The general
problem is synthesized with remarkable
legal and moral implications by District
Judge Wright:
The problems attendant desegregation in the
deep South are considerably more serious
than generally appreciated in some sections
of our country. The problem of changing a
people's mores, particularly those with an
emotional overlay, is not to be taken lightly.
It is a problem which will require the utmost
patience, understanding, generosity and for-
bearance from all of us, of whatever race.
But the magnitude of the problem may not
nullify the principle. And that principle is
that we are, all of us, freeborn Americans',
with a right to make our way, unfettered by
sanctions imposed by man because of the
work of God. 35
The pupil assignment plans have been
declared to be within the strict letter of the
law, while they appear to be without the
spirit of that same law. In content and
administration they leave much to be de-
sired and until some better plan is initiated
to augment their slow and sometimes non-
existent movement towards integration they
should be judged firmly in order to prevent
the inequities of a decision such as Parham
v. Dove.
Uphold Prayer in Public Schools
Petitioners in the case of Engel v. Vitale'
sought an order compelling the local school
district to discontinue the practice of open-
ing class with a non-sectarian prayer,
adopted pursuant to a resolution of the
35 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp.
337, 341-42 (E.D. La. 1956), a/f'd, 242 F.2d 156
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957).
1 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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State Board of Regents. 2 The Special Term
in answer to the complaint held that the
"establishment" clause of the First Amend-
ment does not prohibit the non-compulsory
saying of the prayer in public schools, but
the "free exercise" clause requires that
steps be taken to protect the rights of those
who do not wish to participate. 3
Mr. Justice Meyer's opinion is a fine
example of legal analysis as well as judicial
restraint. Cognizant of the emotionalism
involved in such a controversy, Justice
Meyer made a most thorough study4 of the
scope and comprehension of the First
Amendment "to decide how those who
• ..passed the 'enactment' [First Amend-
ment] would have dealt with the 'particu-
lars' before him.. . ."5 All time-worn emo-
tional and crusading contentions of the
respondents were immediately rejected. 6
2 On Nov. 30, 1951 the New York State Board of
Regents recommended the following non-secta-
rian prayer to be said in conjunction with the
pledge of allegiance to the flag: Almighty God,
we acknowledge our dependence on Thee and
we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers and our Country. Engel v. Vitale, 191
N.Y.S.2d 453, 459, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
3 "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.... U.S. CONST. amend. I. While
there were no allegations of coercion, the wording
of the Regent's resolution constituted at least a
technical violation of the latter clause of the
amendment.
4 Justice Meyer's decision consists of thirty-eight
pages as reported with one hundred and eighty-
seven explanatory footnotes.
5 Engel v. Vitale, supra note 2, at 456. Quoted
from HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 216 (1952).
6 "Juvenile delinquency" and the "specter of God-
less schools" were typical of the emotional con-
tentions rejected by the Court. Engel v. Vitale,
supra note 2, at 466-67. "[T]he constitutional
line to be drawn can only be determined by an
analysis of the fact situation involved, the history
of the constitutional provisions, and the holdings
... of judicial decisions construing the . . pro-
visions .... Ibid.
The Court then took judicial notice of the
fact that as a mode of worship, the relig-
ious nature of prayer has already been well
established.7 After resolving the proced-
ural issues,s the constitutional question was
before the Court: What is the relationship
of prayer and the First Amendment? Jus-
tice Meyer began first with an historical ap-
proach to the issue.
At the time of the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 9 public sentiment was
in favor of the separation of Church and
State, but the Court found no evidence that
this separation was ever extended to the
exclusion of prayer from public school
routines, and it was generally accepted that
schools open with a prayer. 10 It was inevi-
tably concluded therefore that, " 'the sense
7 The Supreme Court recognized the religious na-
ture of prayer in Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S.
67 (1953); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (dictum).
8 The case arose under Article 78 of the New
York Civil Practice Act "to compel performance
of a duty specifically enjoined by law . N.Y.
Crv. PRAc. ACT § 1286.
9 "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. It would be through the Fourteenth
Amendment that the First Amendment would
apply to the states, involving a provision ". .. im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty .. Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See
also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
10 During its infancy, the educational system in
the United States was conducted mainly by the
various religious denominations. A gradual de-
parture from this colonial method began in New
York in 1805 with the formation of our present
day public school system. Among the aims of this
newly formed N.Y. Public School Society were
the principles of religion and morality. CONNORS,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN EDUCATION IN
NEW YORK 1, 3 (1951). See generally PARSONS,
THE FIRST FREEDOM (1948).
of the nation'. . . could not be read as in-
dicating ... the exclusion of prayer from
the public schools.""
Turning to the First Amendment itself,
Justice Meyer, after his examination of both
the history of the period and of the indi-
vidual views of the Founding Fathers them-
selves,1 2 concluded that the First Amend-
ment's relationship to prayer "was general,
in the sense that there should be no com-
pulsion to recite a prescribed form of
prayer, rather than specific .... ",13 There
is nothing to exclude the routine of prayer
provided that it is not compulsory.
The Court found the resolution of the
Board of Regents objectionable to the ex-
tent that it did not provide officially for
the individual's preference as to participa-
tion and was in fact framed in mandatory
terms.14 Subject to modification allowing
objectors to abstain from participation in
11 Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453,474 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
12 The w'itings of Jefferson and Madison seem
always involved in First Amendment controver-
sies. Jefferson, who first coined the phrase "wall
between Church and State" was serving abroad as
Minister to France and did not participate in the
constitutional convention. Madison, despite his
"Remonstrance" interpreted the First Amendment
to mean "that Congress should not establish a
religion and enforce the legal observation of it by
law .... ." PARSONS, THE FIRST FREEDOM 37
(1948). Both Jefferson and Madison participated
in the adoption of the 1824 regulations for the
University of Virginia, which provided inter alia,
"that students of the University..." are "expected
to attend religious worship .. " Engel v. Vitale,
supra note 11, at 476. For a discussion of Jeffer-
son, Madison and the First Amendment, see
BRADY, CONFUSION TWICE CONFOUNDED (1954).
13 Engel v. Vitale, supra note 11, at 476.
14 Id. at 491. The First Amendment is to be used
as a shield, not as a sword. Although petitioner
could not use the amendment to strike down the
resolution, it could protect itself from a real inter-
ference with petitioner's rights.
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the prayer, the resolution may constitution-
ally permit the saying of a non-sectarian
prayer before class.
In First Amendment cases, problems
arising under the "free exercise" clause
seem readily discernible and solutions, as
seen in the instant case, are easily reached.
The major difficulty in this area appears
with a consideration of the "establishment"
clause. Supreme Court cases dealing with
education, religion and the First Amend-
ment have involved to a great extent rela-
tions or aid in some form to one or more
of the various recognized sects.15 On this
consideration, Engel v. Vitale has no coun-
terpart. Assuming that the modification of
the Regent's resolution obviates the "free
exercise" objection, and accepting the
premise that a non-sectarian prayer can be
or has been formulated in the instant case,
Engel v. Vitale appearing before the Su-
preme Court will present an issue not of
preferential treatment for one religion,
16
but the recognition of religion per se, as
a heritage of this country. Such an issue
will call for a concrete definition of this
"wall" between Church and State.
Constitutionally, there seems to be no
15 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Mc-
Collum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Aid to Catholic parochial schools was involved in
the Everson case and both McCollum and Zorach
involved religious instruction. Gideons Interna-
tional, Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons are
other specific sects which have been involved in
First Amendment litigation.
16 It is the preferential treatment of one religion
over another that is prohibited by the "establish-
ment" clause. See COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 259 (1931). For a comprehensive discus-
sion of this area see BRADY, CONFUSION TWICE
CONFOUNDED (1954).
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wall.' 7 That wall which is so often asserted
today appears more to be a dubious monu-
ment constructed judicially,1 8 unmindful of
our heritage and of the intentions of the
Founding Fathers. While the Zorach v.
Clauson decision, strongest foundation of
the instant case, appears as a concession to
this judical structure, its impregnability at
the same time was denied. 19
A review of the Engel case will present
the issue of recognition of religion qua
religion as opposed to no recognition. The
Supreme Court will be called upon to state
whether this judicial wall is really a "spite
fence."
Mr. Justice Meyer's position seems emi-
nently proper. 20 If this jurist's position is
accepted, future problems relating to state
aid to religion from a non-sectarian posi-
tion will be more easily reconciled than
was the case in Zorach.
17 See note 16 supra. "Otherwise the state and re-
ligion would be aliens to each other - hostile, sus-
picious, and even unfriendly." Zorach v. Clauson,
supra note 15, at 312. The First Amendment does
not say that in every and all respects there shall
be a separation of Church and State. "[T]he
First Amendment . . . was conceived to prevent
and prohibit the establishment of a State Religion
... not.., the growth and development of a Reli-
gious State." Lewis v. Allen, 5 Misc.2d 68, 73, 159
N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1957). "[T]his is a
religious nation." Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470 (1892).
18 "The wall which the Court was prolessing to
erect between Church and State has become ...
warped .. " Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
325 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). "[Iln the relation between Church and
State 'good fences make good neighbors'." McCol-
lum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 232 (1948).
19 "We follow the McCollum case." Zorach v.
Clauson, supra note 18, at 315.
20 "Justice and reason forbid a state to be athe-
istic or to be what comes to the same thing as
being atheistic, to have the same attitude towards
various, so-called 'religions' and indifferently to
grant the same rights to all of them." Leonis XIII
Indeterminate Sentencing
Section 1048 of the New York Penal
Law provides that "Murder in the second
degree is punishable by imprisonment un-
der an indeterminate sentence, the mini-
mum of which shall be not less than
twenty years and the maximum of which
shall be for the offender's natural life. .. ."
It is mandatory that the sentence be not
fixed or determined.
Convicted of murder in the second de-
gree, the defendant, at the age of twenty-
nine and with a life expectancy of thirty-
five years as determined by the Actuaries
or Combined Experience Tables of Mor-
tality, was given an indeterminate
sentence of fifty-five years to life imprison-
ment. Since an appeal had not been taken
within the requisite thirty days, the defen-
dant, having served twenty-one years,
sought relief under a writ of error coram
nobis. The Columbia County Court ruled
that the sentence was excessive and im-
posed a new sentence, the minimum of
which shall be twenty-five years and the
maximum the rest of the defendant's na-
tural life.'
Clearly, the prime objective of any
system of criminal law is the over-all pro-
tection of the society which gave birth to
that system. Unhappily, however, the
methods to be employed in achieving that
end are not always perceived with any
such degree of clarity. 2 For, while man
Pontificis Maxima Acta, V, 123; quoted in BAIERL,
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE MODERN STATE
223 (1955).
1 People v. Gilmore, 17 Misc.2d 14, 186 N.Y.S.2d
161 (Columbia County Ct. 1959).
2 HALL & GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ENFORCE-
MENT 14-15 (2d ed. 1958).
may be in complete accord as to the end
to be attained, his means to that end are
characterized chiefly by discord. Various,
and to a certain extent conflicting theories
of punishment have been proffered. The
following are perhaps among the foremost:
1.) The retributive theory represents
the primitive concept of punishment for
the sake of punishment with emphasis on
the crime itself rather than on the criminal.
While it is undeniably true- that society
in a proper case possesses the absolute
right to inflict punishment upon its offend-
ing members, nevertheless to appreciate
the ineffectiveness of any such system
based solely on societal vengeance or retri-
bution one need only glance at some of
the statistical compilations on recidivism. 3
2.) The doctrine of deterrence relies
for effectiveness on appeal to the fear in-
stinct. Fear of severe punishment, it is
believed, will deter an individual so in-
clined from engaging in criminal activity.
The possibility of error in such a doctrine
is sharply illustrated in the instant case by
Judge Connor's reference to the classic
example of the high incidence of pick-
pocketing at public executions of pick-
pockets several centuries ago in England.4
3 "Of the offenders committed to prisons and re-
formatories in 1946, 51 percent had been com-
mitted previously to such institutions, and 6 per-
cent had been committed three or more times.
•.. Sixty-one percent of the prisoners committed
to federal institutions under sentence of more than
one year in 1952 had one or more previous com-
mitments. Of the persons whose fingerprints were
taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
1952, 60.6 percent had prior records on file."
SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 591
(5th ed. 1955).
4 "There are still judges who honestly believe that
6 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1960
3.) The reasoning behind the theory of
disablement is that once removed from
society the individual will no longer be
able to inflict injury upon it. The obvious
truth of the basic ,premise cannot be de-
nied; yet if carried to its logical conclusion
its absurdity is readily seen. For, if the
protection of society depends on the re-
moval from it of those individuals pos-
sessed of criminal inclination, why not
remove them once and for all? Surely
when the emphasis is laid primarily on the
social well-being the most convenient way
to dispose of criminals would be either to
execute them all or to institutionalize them
for life.
While it cannot be successfully contro-
verted that society should be permitted to
take advantage of every scientific method
for self protection against destructive ele-
ments, neither can it be denied that in so
doing there must be a minimum of inter-
ference with the free life of society's mem-
bers as is consistent with such social self
protection. 5 Recognizing this, the more en-
lightened modem philosophy of penology
looks not only for the protection of society
in general but also for the individualization
of the penalty and rehabilitation of the
offender in particular.6 Progressive penal
systems must accept both of these objec-
tives as goals to be attained, for any
system which concentrates on the one to
deterrent effect of punishment for crime is mea-
sured by the severity of the punishment. And this,
notwithstanding the recorded facts of history that
when pickpocketing in England was punishable by
public hanging, the sight of the public execution
was frequently the scene of pickpocketing opera-
tions." People v. Gilmore, 17 Misc. 2d 14, 15, 186
N.Y.S. 2d 161, 164 (Columbia County Ct. 1959).
5 Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41
HARV. L. REV. 453, 455 (1928).
6 See generally, TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY (1912).
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the exclusion of the other would be palpa-
bly inequitable. Any arbitrary overem-
phasis on
social interest in the general security to the
undue interference with the social and indi-
vidual interests in the life and well-being of
each person, is unjust, for it unnecessarily
enslaves human beings. 7
The practice of fixed sentencing, more
often than not, fell far short of both ob-
jectives as the period needed to rehabilitate
a particular offender might be more or less
than the duration of the sentence. Con-
ceivably, an individual could be set free
at the end of the fixed term completely
unrehabilitated, thereby posing a definite
menace to the society to which he was re-
turning or, conversely, be incarcerated long
beyond the necessary time.
It was partially to remedy this basic
defect that the indeterminate sentence was
devised.8 With it came a shift in emphasis,
with the stress laid on the criminal rather
than on the crime. The new system pro-
vided for a term of imprisonment with
minimum and maximum limits with the
power vested in parole boards to release
the rehabilitated offender at any time
within those limits.9 No longer would in-
carceration and its duration depend upon
an arbitrary statutory prescription, but
rather would remain within the discretion
of competent authorities. The rationale
behind the system is that although murder
is always murder, not all murderers are iden-
tical in the motivation of their crimes, in
their emotional makeup, or in their social,
7 Glueck, supra note 4, at 456.
8 Note Indeterminate Sentencing - Half Step To-
ward Science in Law, 10 W. REs. L. REv. 574, 575
(1959).
9 Ibid.
economic and educational backgrounds.
To accord them like treatment would be
scientifically unsound. The offender must
be treated as a distinct personality. He
must be "individualized," which means
first, to differentiate him from other offen-
ders in personality, character, socio-cultural
background, the motivation of his crime
and his particular potentialities for reform
or recidivism and, secondly, to determine
which, among a range of punitive, correc-
tive psychiatric and social measures, is best
adapted to solve the individualized set of
problems presented by that offender in such
a way as materially to reduce the probability
of his committing crimes in the future. 10
It was early recognized that the efficacy
of the system depended upon a reformatory
discipline
with a marking or grading system for esti-
mating the convict's response thereto, parole
for a further period outside the prison with
supervision of some sort over the conduct
of the paroled prisoner and return to prison
in case such conduct was not satisfactory
or a violation of parole."
Since such a program obviously re-
quired an institution completely different
from the old type prison, the indeterminate
sentence was intended to be applied to one
particular category of offenders, that is,
those sentenced to reformatories. 12 Gradu-
ally, however, it spread to the state prisons,
some of which even adopted various re-
formatory features.' 3
Ideally, the indeterminate sentence
10Glueck, The Sentencing Problem, 20 FED.
PROB. 15, 16 (Dec. 1956).
11 Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate
Sentence and Parole System, 16 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 9, 70 (1925).
12 Id. at 70-7 1.
13 Id. at 72.
should be an absolute one, leaving the
decision as to time of release up to the
judgment of prison officials or special
boards of penologists. Practically, how-
ever, the present day indeterminate sen-
tence appears to be the result of a com-
promise between the advocates of the
deterrent and those of the retributive
theories of punishment. It is ordinarily
indeterminate only between fixed limits,
the extent of which depends upon the na-
ture of the crime. In New York, for in-
stance, in a case of murder in the second
degree, confinement is for a term indeter-
minate between twenty years and life,1 4
while a less serious crime such as first
degree burglary is punishable by an in-
determinate sentence with a minimum of
ten years and a maximum of thirty years.15
There is, however, one truly indeterminate
sentence in New York. For conviction of
certain sex offenses the offender is subject
to imprisonment for a minimum term of
one day and a maximum of life."
The very nature of the indeterminate
sentence presupposes some sort of pre-
sentencing investigation, however cursory.
For it is impossible to see how one of-
fender could be differentiated from others
"in personality, character, socio-cultural
background, the motivation of his crime
and his particular potentialities for reform
or recidivism"' 7 without looking into the
individual's past. It is, therefore, of no
little significance that in his opinion Judge
Connor inserted the testimony of the at-
14 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1048.
15 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 407.
16 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2010. He may also be sen-
tenced to a definite term of up to twenty years.
17 Glueck, The Sentencing problem, 20 FED.
PROB. 15, 16 (Dec. 1956).
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torney who defended Gilmore to the effect
that
the trial court, contrary to the usual prac-
tice then prevailing, did not confer with
me ... before imposing sentence upon this
defendant, nor to my knowledge was any
pre-sentence investigation or examination
directed to the end that the court might
have sufficient information to aid the court
in determining the proper sentence to be
imposed.18
From the foregoing it would seem to be
a valid conclusion that the sentence was
imposed on the defendant arbitrarily and
in direct violation of known legislative in-
tent. In essence it was as effective as defi-
nitely confining the defendant to life
imprisonment under a law where " a sen-
tence to straight life imprisonment would
be illegal.' u 9 As was pointed out in People v.
McCann, with reference to indeterminate
sentencing, "the legislation has for its ob-
ject moral reformation rather than punish-
ment, and it is therefore 'wholesome in its
character, and the courts should be reluc-
tant to thwart or impede its efficiency'. '20
To allow such a sentence to stand would
be to ignore completely the tremendous
advancements made in the field of penol-
ogy. It would, in effect, constitute a return
to the antiquated policy of punishment for
the sake of punishment.
18 People v. Gilmore, 17 Misc. 2d 14, 15, 186
N.Y.S. 2d 161, 163 (Columbia County Ct. 1959).
19 ld. at 17, 186 N.Y.S. 2d at 165.
20 199 App. Div. 30, 38, 191 N.Y. Supp. 574, 579
(1st Dep't), afl'd, 234 N.Y. 502, 138 N.E. 422
(1922).
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Punishment of the Habitual Criminal
The problem of the habitual criminal
and the treatment he should receive from
society has long been a subject of penal
theory. Increased severity of punishment
for recidivists was recognized early in our
state penal systems,' and under the impetus
of the investigations of various crime com-
missions established following World War
I the habitual criminal statute became the
dominant method of sentencing those con-
victed of repeated crimes. 2 A recent case
in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit3 sustained the Indiana
Habitual Criminal Act 4 against a challenge
that it violated the ban on involuntary
servitude contained in the Thirteenth
Amendment. The statute provided that:
Every person who, after having been twice
convicted . . . for felony . . . shall be con-
victed ... for a felony hereafter committed,
shall be deemed and taken to be an habitual
criminal, and he or she shall be sentenced
to imprisonment in the state prison for and
during his or her life. 5
Petitioner, in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing, contended that because of the wording
of the statute, the increased punishment
was being imposed because of his status
as an habitual criminal, rather than for
crime as prescribed in the Thirteenth
Amendment. The Court affirmed the dis-
1 See, e.g., MASS. LAWS OF 1817, ch. 176, § 6.
2 The most famous of these were the "Baumes
Laws" adopted in New York State. See Brown,
The Treatment of the Recidivist in the United
States, 23 CAN. B. REV. 640, 642 (1945).
3 United States ex rel. Smith v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d
292 (7th Cir. 1959).
4 InD. ANN. STAT. § 9-2207 (1956).
5 Ibid.
missal of the petition with separate opin-
ions for the majority, and held that
imprisonment under the Act was for crime
within the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment.6
The constitutionality of habitual offender
laws generally has been attacked on sev-
eral grounds. The courts have held that
an habitual criminal act was not an ex post
facto law nor retroactive in effect. They do
not create a new offense, but only increase
the severity of the punishment imposed
upon the conviction for a subsequent of-
fense because of the offender's past con-
duct.7 Nor is a statute enhancing the
punishment for a subsequent offense un-
constitutional as putting the accused twice
in jeopardy of life or liberty.s The argu-
ment of cruel and unusual punishment has
likewise been consistently rejected by the
courts.9 Due process and equal protection
of the laws contentions have met a similar
fate.10 In McDonald v. Massachusetts,1
6 One judge dissented, feeling that the statute was
a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment as a
punishment for status. United States ex rel. Smith
v. Dowd, note 3 supra, at 297 (Parkinson, J., dis-
senting).
7 Ex parte Brazel, 293 Mich. 632, 292 N.W. 664
(1940); Blackburn v, State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36
N.E. 18 (1893). See 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMrrATIONs 553-54 (8th ed. 1927).
8 State v. Holder, 49 Idaho 514, 290 Pac. 387
(1930); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky.
802, 125 S.W. 2d 728 (1939) (dictum).
9 State v. Zywicki, 175 Minn. 508, 221 N.W. 900
(1928); see Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S.
616 (1912).
10 Graham v. West Virginia, supra note 9; Davis
v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 708, 291 N.W. .82, cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 682 (1940). "
a1 180 U.S. 311 (1901). The procedural fairness
of the common method of indictment under the
habitual offender laws which presents allegations
of prior convictions to a jury which must decide
the United States Supreme Court held that
an habitual offender law made a reasonable
classification and operated equally on all
persons within the class.
With regard to the issue raised in the
principal case, that of punishment for
crime versus punishment for status, the
problem is largely one of semantics. One
judge's opinion, in rejecting petitioner's
contention, took the position that the pun-
ishment was for the new crime only.'
2
Accepting the definition of "crime" in its
normal sense, i.e., certain specific conduct
usually with a defined required intent, and
no more, such reasoning is unrealistic and
unnecessary. The additional punishment is
not, in fact, being imposed for what the
defendant did, i.e., the crime, because what
he did is the same, be he a first or a third
offender. The additional punishment is im-
posed for what he is, i.e., an habitual
criminal demonstrably dangerous to soci-
ety. Both sound legal philosophy and sub-
stantive due process demand that one
can't be convicted for what one is, just for
what one does: criminal conduct is neces-
sary. Since conviction is prerequisite to
punishment, manifestly, criminal conduct
is also a sine qua non to the imposition of
any punishment. But the mandate of the
Thirteenth Amendment that involuntary
the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the prin-
cipal charge has been criticized. State v. Ferrone,
96 Conn. 160, 113 Atl. 452 (1921). While the
constitutionality of such a procedure has been ad-
mitted, Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616,
629 (1912), the so-called English method whereby
the charge of prior convictions is made known to
the jury only after a verdict of guilty is returned
for the principal offence, appears to better protect
the defendant against prejudice. See Note, 11 RUT-
GERS L. Rnv. 654, 663 (1957).
12 United States ex rel. Smith v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d
292, 295-96 (1959) (opinion of Castle, J.).
6 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1960
servitude shall not exist "except as pun-
ishment for crime, whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted"'13 merely re-
quires that a crime be the occasion of pun-
ishment, the degree of which is permissibly
affected by other, passive factors such as
a proven habit of criminality. Indeed, this
must be so if the modern penal approach
of moulding the punishment to fit the
criminal is to be sustained.
Apart from the legality of habitual of-
fender laws under human, positive law,
different considerations present themselves
when such laws are examined in light of
the position of punishment in diverse
theories of the legal order. It is the Thom-
istic position that, while the primary effi-
cacy of law is due to the rational
acceptance of its mandates by men who
recognize the justice of the prescribed con-
duct and conform to it out of that recog-
nition,14 men are also free and have it in
their power to disregard the rights of their
fellowmen. Thus sanction must exist as a
line of defense to maintain the social order
against the unfettered transgressions to
which it would otherwise be subject.' 5
Thomistic jurisprudence recognizes the
modern penal theories of how punishment
operates for the common good; disable-
ment,16 reformation, 17 and deterrence.' s
Indeed, even the basic approach of the
habitual offender law can be found in the
words of St. Thomas: "The punishments
of the present life are medicinal, and there-
fore when one punishment does not suffice
13 U. S. CONST. amend. XIIL
1 4 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I q. 92, art. 2.
15 ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW, AND SANCTION 20
(1937).
16 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-I, q. 68, art. 1.
17 Ibid.
18 Id. at I1-I, q. 108, art. 3.
RECENT DECISIONS
to compel a man, another is added: just
as physicians employ several body medi-
cines when one has no effect."1 9
While Thomistic jurisprudence recog-
nizes that sanction must be directed toward
man's sensitive nature, 20 it maintains that
the initial command is necessarily directed
toward his rational nature.21 This latter
concept is denied by the jurisprudence of
positivism as expounded by such men as
Mr. Justice Holmes, who would mould law
to the gratification of as many of man's
sensitive appetites and instincts as possible
without regard to the reasonableness of the
prescribed conduct. 22 Thus, since the com-
mand is not bottomed in right reason,
Holmes cannot rely on man's observance,
out of intellectual accord with its rectitude,
of a rule that protects the interests of
others at the cost of his own convenience
in a given situation. So force, actual or
potential, is seen as the sole motivation for
compliance. While sanctions are justified
under the Thomistic concept of law, and
indeed seen as necessary to its successful
existence, their position as the determinant
of societal tranquility is not accepted. The
common phenomenon of a clamorous de-
mand for greater punishments during peri-
ods of extensive community disorder is a
natural outgrowth of the "bad-man" theory
of the law as expressed by Holmes, where
respect for the law is coterminous with
fear of punishment. The Thomist sees such
fear as a most inefficient means of securing
19 Id. at Il-I, q. 39, art. 4, ad 3.
20 Id. at I-I, q. 108, art. 3.
21 A law is first and foremost an ordinance of
reason. Id. at I-II, q. 90, art. 4.
22 "The first requirement of a sound body of law
is, that it should correspond with the actual feel-
ings and demands of the community whether right
or wrong." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 41
(1946).
compliance with the law. With the basic
postulate that man, as a reasonable being,
will comply with a just law simply because
his reason sees it as such, efforts at pro-
mulgation and education appear most
productive. However, with regard to the
particular segment of the community at
which habitual offender laws are aimed,
all will agree that this group constitutes
the least likely to follow the dictates of
reason and is most affected by sanctions
which threaten the removal of sensitive
pleasures; so precious have those goods
become to those individuals as to displace
habits of right conduct. From this stand-
point, and on this ground, both theories
appear to be in accord with the approach
expressed in the habitual offender statutes.
While the legal justification and, in a
general way, the value of existing recidi-
vist laws are not to be denied, there exists
a progressive school of penology, which,
in studying such laws on the level of their
social desirability, is impatient with the
uniform inflexible treatment applied to a
class such as recidivists and regards a
highly individualized treatment of all of-
fenders as the desideratum of penal
method. In an application of the ancient
principle of epikeia this group seeks to
mitigate the rigors of the abstract rule in
the individual case by the use of the inde-
terminate sentence, 23 sentencing boards,24
and even the abandonment of the punitive
method and the adoption of other, human-
ized corrective treatments.2 5 However, the
23 Metcalf, Recidivism and the Courts, 26 J. CRM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 367 (1936).
2 4 Timasheff, The Treatment of Persistent Offend-
ers Outside of the United States, 30 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 455 (1939).
25 WAITE, THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED CRIME
86-89 (1943).
fact that we are apt to have more reliable
knowledge about classes than about indi-
viduals, the possibility of abuses of discre-
tion, and the practical difficulties of
administration are certainly factors to be
weighed in evaluating a penology of indi-
vidualization. 26
Undoubtedly debate will continue con-
cerning the methods that best approach
perfection in the treatment of habitual of-
26 Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law,
49 YALE L. J. 987, 1022 (1940).
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fenders. In the absence of the perfect
statute to apply, it but remains for the
courts to apply the imperfect as justly as
possible. The treatment of the Indiana Ha-
bitual Criminal Act by the Court in the
principal case is such an application in
view of the context in history of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, the purpose of which
was the declaration of newly enforced
freedoms, not the imposition of a subtle
and stultifying restriction of the penal
treatment of those who stand convicted of
criminal conduct.
SOLUTION OF
"THE EVIL THAT MEN DO"
(Continued)
entitles him, under the law, to the relief
he asks. In pleading and in argument the
court will be asked to conclude from the
testimony of Molly's Connshire neighbors
that she and Black contracted marriage by
mutual agreement. Though the testimony
will state facts objectively true and will be
veraciously offered by the witnesses, the
request that the court find this conclusion
implies that it is true, while in fact it is a
lie. If the conclusion is asserted or its find-
ing requested in verified pleadings, morally
there is perjury, though perhaps not from
the view of the criminal law.
The assertion and maintenance of this
claim before the court is an unjust harass-
ment of the executor and the Orphanage
Trustees, and will incur duties of restitu-
tion quite similar to those discussed in our
reply to the third question - in respect
both of consequential damages of the har-
assment and of any money or property
settlement extorted thereby.
Finally, the reader should note that this
problem case and the moral questions in-
volved have made no reference to the
Canon Law. If the Orphanage were an
institution of Catholic charity, rather than
a purely humane philanthropy as we have
here assumed, the Canons would impose
duties additional to those discussed in the
four answers above, but the conclusions
reached here would not be altered. Even
if the common-law marriage were invalid
because, for example, Molly or Black was
a Catholic who could not marry validly
except in a Catholic ceremony, her moral
rights as a successor in Black's property
would still be governed directly by the law
of the two states.
